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Abstract: Using micro-level panel data from villages in rural Ethiopia, the paper uses standard decompositions of 
income changes and develops a new decomposition of poverty changes to analyse the determinants of growth and 
poverty changes during a period of economic reform (1989-95). Consumption grew and poverty fell substantially, 
but the experience was mixed. I find that common and idiosyncratic shocks mattered, but that the main factors 
driving income changes are relative price changes, resulting in changes in the returns to land, labour, human 
capital and location. A regression-based decomposition of the changes in poverty shows that the poor have 
benefited on average more from the reforms than the non-poor households. But the experience of the poor is 
mixed: one group of the poor in 1989, with relatively good land, labour and location, outperformed all other 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1988, Ethiopia has gradually moved from a communist-inspired controlled economy to a 
more market-based economy. From 1992, these reforms became part of a structural adjustment 
programme sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank. Much has been written on the 
consequences of structural adjustment on growth and poverty (Cornia et al. (1987), Sahn (1994, 
1996), Demery and Squire (1996)). More in general, new evidence on the role of growth on 
poverty alleviation has revived the debate as well (Ravallion and Datt (2000), Dollar and Kraay 
(2000), Srinivasan (2000)). Most studies appear to acknowledge that data remain a problem. 
Systematic micro-level evidence on both growth and poverty after market reforms take place 
remains limited. 
 
This paper uses a panel data set on 362 rural households in six communities collected in 1989 
and in 1994-95. This is not only a small data set but also not a representative sample of rural 
Ethiopia. Consequently, the results in this paper should not be viewed as evidence for overall 
poverty trends. The focus is on whether one can find evidence of the link between reforms, 
growth and changes in poverty. In this way, the paper provides evidence on the mechanisms by 
which, given the current conditions and policies, growth is transmitted into rural poverty 
alleviation. In order to achieve this, a simple panel-data based decomposition of the effects of 
growth on poverty is presented, allowing one to distinguish the contribution of different factors 
to overall poverty changes. In particular, I can distinguish the impact of reforms from the 
consequences of shocks and of exogenous changes in assets.  
 
Methodologically, this study differs substantially from other studies in the literature (for 
reviews, see Lipton and Ravallion (1995), Azam (1994)). Ignoring the many studies using 
flimsy, non-comparable or highly aggregated data sources, some studies limit themselves to 
outcome indicators at different points in time and use a macroeconomic narrative to argue that 
observed changes are the consequence of the policy changes (for one such study, see Demery 
and Squire (1996)). A criticism against these studies is that they cannot separate the effects of 
the reforms from other factors, such as external shocks or simply the lagged consequences of 
past recessions. Computable general equilibrium models can avoid these problems, by allowing 
the impact of different counterfactual scenarios to be evaluated. Sahn (1997) presents a 
collection of such studies; earlier attempts are in Bourgignon et al. (1991). A drawback is 
related to the immense data requirements for them and the strong structure that needs to be 
imposed on such models, resulting in questions about the realism involved. Other studies are 
sectoral in nature and provide detailed evidence on the effects of reforms on particular 
activities. These studies provide important evidence but may not easily make conclusions about 
the overall welfare effects.   
 
By using comparable data sets over time, more detailed analysis is possible, not just of outcome 
indicators, but also of other factors. For example, Grootaert (1995) uses detailed socio-
economic characteristics to check whether in different periods of the adjustment process in 
Côte d’Ivoire the evidence is consistent with reforms driving the outcomes. Alternatively, 
econometric approaches can go some way to control for the problems of other factors driving 
the outcome, rather than the reforms, provided the information is available. In the context of 
Ethiopia, an important issue about rural outcomes is whether the outcomes are not just driven 
by different weather conditions in different years, rather than changing economic incentives. I   2 
will do this by controlling for common and idiosyncratic shocks in the regressions. 
Nevertheless, when only repeated cross-section data sets are available, but if sufficient detail is 
available in the survey data to model the changing determinants of welfare outcomes, much can 
still be done. Micro-simulation approaches can then provide useful insights in the micro-level 
link between income growth and poverty (the study by Bourgignon et al. (2001) provides an 
example). The current paper is similar in spirit, but the availability of panel data has certain 
econometric advantages while allowing to have directly observed information on movements of 
individuals across the welfare distribution.  
 
Generalising about the effects on poverty of macroeconomic and market-oriented reforms is 
difficult. Measures such as devaluation or liberalisation cause relative prices to changes and 
have a priori ambiguous effects on welfare (Kanbur (1987)). For example, a real exchange rate 
depreciation increases prices to the tradable goods sector relative to the non-tradable sector, but 
the effect on welfare for particular groups will depend on whether their earnings relative to 
their consumption will depend more on goods from one sector relative to the other. If the poor 
produce or earn a wage from tradables, while they mainly consume non-tradables, then they 
would benefit. However, whether this indeed characterises the poor cannot be stated in general 
(Lipton and Ravallion (1995)). Furthermore, reforms, as those in Ethiopia, involve many 
measures, including internal market reforms, affecting different households and regions 
differently. Finally, even if market prices move favourable for particular households, the net 
welfare effects of these price changes depend on the functioning of other markets. De Janvry et 
al. (1991) have analysed and illustrated using simulations that the supply responsiveness to 
increased tradables prices is strongly dependent on whether any factor and goods markets are 
missing or work imperfectly. Clearly, to understand the effects of general macro-level measures 
on households, a careful and local analysis of both relative price movements and local market 
functioning is needed.  
 
In the next section, I briefly discuss the nature of the reform process in Ethiopia in this period. 
Then, the data available and villages studied are presented. Section 4 presents the methodology 
for studying the impact on real incomes of the reforms and the decomposition of the factors 
contributing to poverty changes. Section 5 gives the econometric analysis, while sections 6 and 
7 provide the decomposition and some micro-simulations of counterfactual scenarios, such as 
the income and poverty changes if no reforms had taken place. 
 
2. Economic reforms in Ethiopia 1989-95 
 
The 1980s had been a period of crisis. Since the late 1970s, the urban economy had been 
organised into a state-controlled planned economy, using communist models. The rural 
economy was largely ignored and heavily taxed. Taxation took the form of direct taxes and 
levies of various kinds and forced labour on community development projects or other 
activities determined by the state. It also included regular forced delivery to a parastatal 
corporation, the AMC, of a specified quota of grain. Implicit taxation resulted from bans or 
restrictions on private grain trade and trade in export crops. In the mid-1980s, famine and war 
had not just created a big humanitarian disaster, but also pushed the economy further back. The 
fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent political and economic events facing Ethiopia’s main 
sponsors led to a serious economic crisis. By 1988, they triggered the start of economic 
reforms.    3 
 
Although reforms have since continued, the nature of the reforms and other events in the period 
until 1994 was very dramatic. First, a new political situation emerged after the end of the civil 
war in 1991. Security was largely restored in most parts of the countries, at least until the late 
1990s. Secondly, market reform had just started in food markets around the time of the first 
round of the survey. This period also saw the first encouragement of market-based activities 
after the declaration of the ‘mixed economy’ in 1988, resulting in some incentives for private 
sector activities from the late 1980s. In 1992, the birr was devalued by 142 percent and foreign 
exchange rationing gradually lessened. No inflationary effects followed from the devaluation, 
partly helped by good harvests. Close to zero inflation in 1992 and low inflation in subsequent 
years has meant a strong depreciation of the real exchange rate. In 1992, fertiliser market 
reform was started with the gradual removal of subsidies.  
 
The national accounts reflect the changing fortunes of the Ethiopian economy. GDP data show 
first the dramatic collapse around the famine period of 1985, a subsequent recovery but a 
further collapse around the transition period of the end of the war. Recovery then started and by 
1995, the economy was, in per capita terms, more or less back at the level of the end of the 
1980s. Subsequent growth has meant that at last Ethiopia has passed its 1982 level of per capita 
GDP.  
 
This pattern hides some important composition changes in this period. The collapse in overall 
GDP in the late 1980s can mainly be accounted for by a collapse in government expenditure, 
driven by a collapse in revenue collection, and a large fall in gross investment. Deflated private 
consumption per capita continued to rise. By 1995, it was just under 14 percent higher than in 
1989. Gross investment also recovered fast, but the share of government consumption in GDP 
far less so. However, it would be wrong to attribute the decline in direct taxation to the reforms. 
With the war escalating, and given that a large part of taxation came from rural areas or trade, 
revenue collection had collapsed. The subsequent total collapse of the government implied 
further erosion of revenue collection. 
 
All this makes Ethiopia an interesting case to study the link between economic reforms, growth 
and poverty. Contrary to a lot of other countries, no fundamental derailment of reforms 
occurred after devaluation. In fact, remarkable macroeconomic stability was maintained. Also, 
the cuts in government expenditure predated reforms, so there is no coinciding effect on 
households via substantial cuts in social expenditure – if anything, by the late 1980s social 
services had already collapsed, only to recover gradually well into the 1990s. The result is that 
we can study micro-level economic reform via changing incentives almost in isolation from 
some of usual macroeconomic and expenditure reducing ‘side effects’.  
  
How did economic reform affect the rural economy? In order to study this, it is useful to 
distinguish the effects on incentives for food production, for non-food crops and for off-farm 
activities. Food market reform started from 1990 onwards. As was mentioned, the quota system 
on farmers and the high taxation on movement of crops both imposed heavy taxes on farmers. 
The main direct effect of the removal of the quota is a real income gain by farmers. The effect 
on open market food prices is harder to predict; it can be shown to have been ambiguous 
(Azam (1994), Dercon (2001)).  
   4 
The effects on prices from the relaxation and later abolition of restrictions on private grain 
trade are easier to predict. Unlike other African countries (and despite the anti-private sector 
attitude of the economic policy in the 1980s), private interregional trade was not banned, with 
the exception of a few surplus regions (such as Gojjam). Traders were however heavily taxed 
when trying to move grain around the country. They were forced to sell 50 percent or more of 
the quantity traded to the Agricultural Marketing Corporation, at fixed prices below market 
prices. The consequence of the traders’ quota was to increase the marketing margins between 
different regions on the open market.  Liberalisation would then have resulted in upward 
pressure on prices in surplus areas and downward pressure in deficit areas.  
 
In annex 1, evidence is presented on this. The main conclusion is that margins indeed became 
lower. Prices in surplus areas went up in real terms, while prices in deficit areas remained more 
or less stable. The most important effects were found to have taken place during the 
liberalisation period, even before the end of the war, suggesting that the effects are directly 
linked to reforms. Furthermore, one observes lower seasonality in food prices as well.  
 
The impact of the reforms in this period on internationally traded non-food crops such as coffee 
and chat (a popular drug in the Eastern part of Ethiopia and surrounding countries) mainly 
came from the large exchange rate devaluation in 1992. However, these effects are complicated 
because of large-scale parallel market activity and smuggling before the devaluation.  
 
Coffee, the most important export crop, is such a case. The farmgate price recovery was not as 
substantial as the devaluation would have suggested. Substantial volumes were smuggled, 
while (given high domestic coffee consumption) internal parallel markets also thrived. The 
relative stability of the black market exchange rate would have meant that the devaluation 
would not have affected coffee prices for those farmers. Nevertheless, relative to the black 
market, the official farmgate prices appear to have improved somewhat, so some response in 
official supplies and export volumes could be expected. Given the planting-output lags, there is 
evidence of some switching from parallel to official markets (Dercon et al. (1995)). Finally, the 
evolution of prices in our study period is however convoluted by the coffee boom of 1994-95, 
during which unit export values rose by up to 65 percent. 
 
Other export crops were similarly affected. One of them deserves some more attention: chat
1. 
Growing demand in surrounding countries had resulted in a doubling of the chat border price at 
the official exchange rate during the 1980s. While relative to coffee still a small export crop, it 
has become more popular throughout Ethiopia as a source of cash, also due to somewhat easier 
growing requirements. It has never been officially promoted, if only due to its addictive 
properties and the fact that it is illegal in most Western countries. Its relative neglect meant that 
taxation was limited, while smuggling relatively easy. For such a crop, the devaluation was 
again relatively irrelevant. 
 
As was discussed before, consumer prices did not pick up after the devaluation. An important 
reason was that imports of many consumer goods had increasingly come via the parallel market 
and this did not change markedly in the first few years after the devaluation. Prices therefore 
did not change much. Other commodities, such as fuel, initially remained subsidised and 
                                                            
1 Chat or q´at is a valuable amphetamine-type stimulant, increasingly popular in Ethiopia and in neighbouring 
countries.   5 
increases were limited to levels below inflation. Fertiliser prices remained subsidised until after 
1995, so they were also not much affected.  
 
Finally, off-farm activities, such as business and wage labour, were positively affected by the 
reforms, even though not really promoted until well into the study period. During the 1980s, 
private sector activities had been at times repressed, while the war is likely to have had an 
important on labour and goods mobility. With the start of the reforms in 1990, most restrictions 
were lifted while the return to peace is likely to have had a positive impact as well. Even on the 
changing incentives for such activities, for example in the form of prices, are hard to come by, 
and the impact of reforms and peace are likely to be difficult to distinguish.  
 
To conclude, economic reform is likely to have substantially changed relative prices in the rural 
economy. The impact on real food prices is likely to be dependent on whether villages are in 
surplus or deficit areas, while the impact of the real exchange rate depreciation will depend on 
the extent of smuggling and parallel market activity before the devaluation in a particular area. 
Finally, off-farm activities are likely to have been encouraged as well via the reforms, but the 
effect is likely to be convoluted with the impact of the return to peace and security after 1991.  
 
3. The study villages and economic reform 1989-1995 
 
In this section, I will introduce the six communities studied, from which a random sample was 
selected, yielding complete information on 354 households (the attrition rate between 1989 and 
1995 was about 5 percent).  The initial sample of villages was selected to study the crisis and 
recovery from drought and famine in the mid-1980s (Webb et al. (1992)). Details on the survey 
are in Dercon and Krishnan (1998). The villages are located in the central and southern part of 
the country. In 1989, the war made it impossible to survey any northern villages. Nevertheless, 
the villages combine a variety of characteristics, common in rural Ethiopia. Four of the villages 
are cereal growing villages, one is in a coffee/enset area and one grows mainly sorghum but has 
been experiencing rapid expansion of chat. All but one not too far from towns, but only half 
have an all-weather road.  
 
Virtually all households are involved in agriculture and have access to land, although with 
important differences in quality and across villages. About 50 percent of income is derived 
from crops, the rest from livestock and off-farm activities. Many of the off-farm activities (such 
as selling home-made drinks or dungcakes) are closely linked to the agricultural activities. 
Alternatives are collecting firewood, making charcoal and weaving.  
 
In this paper, we use data from 1989 and from the revisits during three rounds in 1994-95. The 
data from 1989 reflect conditions on the eve of the reforms, while the later data are from well 
into the post-reform period. During this period, the civil war affected the communities 
relatively little, at least in terms of direct effects. With most fighting in the north of the country, 
in no villages was any fighting or other direct effects from the war reported. Consequently, the 
direct effects of increased security, such as more opportunities for mobility towards local 
markets and lower price margins, are unlikely to have been very important.  
 
Other changing conditions should also be taken into account when trying to explain welfare 
outcomes. Rainfall is generally erratic, but crucial for agricultural incomes. While 1994 was   6 
quite a good year for all but two communities (i.e. above normal rains), it was only better than 
1989 for two communities; on average it was worse in the sample (which is against the national 
average patterns). On average in the sample, the five-year average rainfall was slightly better in 
the 1990s than before. Few other village-level characteristics changed in this period; for 
example NGO-activity remained similar. There was some improvement to the road in Gara 
Godo, even though it still meant that the road was not an all-weather road.  
 
So what happened in terms of welfare outcomes in these villages?  We will report two 
indicators (details and more descriptive statistics on these indicators are in Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000b)). First, we use food consumption data per adult equivalent in real terms. No 
complete data on non-food consumption were collected in 1989, so they are not reported. Food 
consumption is deflated by a food price deflator, using regional prices collected by the Central 
Statistical Authority. Consumption is expressed in 1994 prices. Nutritional equivalence scales 
specific for East-Africa were used to control for household size and composition. Since food 
consumption is unlikely to be characterised by economies of scale, no further scaling is used 
(Deaton (1997)).   
 
The underlying questionnaire was based on a one-week recall of food consumption, from own 
sources, purchased or from gifts. Seasonal analysis using the panel revealed rather large 
seasonal fluctuations in consumption, seemingly linked to price and labour demand fluctuations 
(Dercon and Krishnan (2000a)). Therefore, I used the food consumption levels in the same 
season as when the data had been collected in 1989, as the measure for food consumption in 
1994/95. Consequently, only one observation of the three possible data points collected during 
the 1994/95 rounds. 
 
Table 1 Changes in food consumption per adult equivalent between 1989 and 1994/95  
(in 1994 prices) (n=354) 









mean  food  consumption    1989  50  53 64 37 27 25 42 
mean food consumption 1994  62  96  108  40  20  80  64 
yearly growth mean (%)  4.3  12.4  11.1  1.5  -5.0  21.4  8.8 
 
Table 1 gives the results. Overall, we observe strong growth in mean per adult food 
consumption in this period in this sample: equivalent to about 9 percent per year. But there are 
substantial differences between villages. In one village, mean food consumption seems to have 
declined, while in three, growth is more than 10 percent. Note that growth is in four out of six 
cases well above the growth rate of private consumption per capita in the national accounts. It 
is also much higher than growth in agricultural GDP. Note that this does not need to be 
inconsistent since a large part of the possible welfare gain from the reforms would have been a 
reduction in implicit and explicit taxation of farmers, although it is still likely to be above the 
national trend.  
 
It is of interest to look at what has happened in this period with households at the lower end of 
the distribution. A simple and intuitively appealing way is to first identify the poor using a 
poverty line and then consider the evolution of different poverty aggregates. The panel data 
also allows us to look at poverty transitions in this period.  To identify the poor, I use an 
absolute, nutrition-based poverty line. It will be kept fixed in real terms both intertemporally   7 
and spatially. In different areas in the sample it is in the range 35-45 birr per month per month
2. 
This poverty line is applied to the real food consumption data. P-alpha poverty aggregates as in 
Foster et al. (1984) are used to express different dimensions of poverty. In particular, the head 
count, the average normalised poverty gap and the average squared poverty gap, are presented.  
 
 Table 2  Poverty between 1989 and 1994/95 (n=358) 









Head  count  1989  0.42 0.34 0.42 0.73 0.80 0.86 0.61 
Poverty  Gap  1989  0.14 0.12 0.10 0.39 0.46 0.45 0.29 
Squared Poverty Gap 1989  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.25  0.30  0.27  0.17 
Head  count  1994/95  0.57 0.26 0.16 0.62 0.95 0.39 0.51 
Poverty  Gap  1994/95  0.19 0.06 0.04 0.22 0.53 0.23 0.22 
Squared Poverty Gap 1994/95  0.09  0.02  0.02  0.10  0.34  0.16  0.12 
Percentage change         
Head Count   +36  -24  -61  -15  +18  -55  -16 
Poverty Gap   +32  -49  -60  -45  +15  -48  -26 
Squared Poverty Gap   +32  -66  -62  -60  +13  -39  -31 
Poverty elasticity at mean
a         
Head Count   1.53  -0.30  -0.88  -1.98  -0.68  -0.25  -0.30 
Poverty Gap   1.37  -0.62  -0.86  -5.82  -0.57  -0.22  -0.49 
Squared Poverty Gap   1.33  -0.84  -0.90  -7.88  -0.47  -0.18  -0.59 
aThe poverty elasticity is calculated as the ratio between the actual percentage change in poverty and the growth in 
mean consumption between 1989 and 1994/95. 
 
Table 2 gives the results. Overall, poverty fell during this period. The headcount declined by 16 
percent, the other poverty measures by even more. The different experiences across villages are 
also clear. In four villages, we observed a substantial decline; in the two other villages, an 
increase in poverty
3. Overall, poverty remains high at about 50 percent. In five out of six 
villages are growth and poverty declines inversely related, as one would expect. Finally, note 
that the poverty elasticities are typically relatively small, except for in one village, where low 
growth appears to have coincided with substantial poverty declines.  The overall poverty 
decreases across the sample are robust to the choice of the poverty line: in Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000b) first order welfare dominance was shown to exist for all reasonable poverty 
lines.  
 
These figures hide substantial poverty transitions in both directions as well. About 35 percent 
of the sample remained poor in both years, while 26 percent moved out of poverty. But about 
16 percent moved into poverty in this period as well. Finally, the Gini-coefficient moved up a 
little in this period, from 42.3 to 44.8.  A decomposition of the total change in the head count 
into a ‘growth’ and a ‘redistribution’ effect (as in Datt and Ravallion (1992), Kakwani (1993a)) 
                                                            
2The basis is a measure of the cost of basic food needs (Ravallion (1994), Ravallion and Bidani (1993)). The food 
needs are determined by considering the average diet of the lower half of the consumption distribution. Then, this 
diet is valued at local prices (using 1994 prices). The poverty lines obtained for each village in 1994 dollars 
suggest about 7 US dollars per month per adult. Even using a typical PPP-deflator of about a third, this is still well 
below the one-dollar-a-day norm.  
3 In Dercon and Krishnan (2000) significance levels of these poverty changes have been reported, following 
Kakwani (1993b). The overall declines and the changes in four out of six villages were significant at 5 percent or 
less.   8 
showed that inequality increases made poverty higher by 3.1 percentage points but growth 
brought poverty down by 13.2 percentage points.  In conclusion, growth was rather high in 
these villages and poverty declined considerably, although the poverty elasticity appears 
generally low. Inequality increases, movements into poverty and generally different experiences 
across communities in this period suggest that growth did not affect households in the same 
way. Differential impact of the reforms is a possible explanation, but their different exposure to 
weather and other shocks is also a plausible one.  
 
How did reforms affect these communities? Given the relative importance of crop agriculture 
in the local economy, the evolution of producer prices relative to overall consumer price 
inflation provides a useful starting point for the analysis of the impact of the reforms. Table 3 
gives the average increase in producer prices in each of the communities, relative to the 
consumer price evolution. It can be read as the percentage movement in terms of trade, using 
1989 terms of trade between producer and consumer goods as a base. I report the percentage 
change of the average real producer prices per community for all crops, as well as for sub-
groups
4. Since the reforms generally provide increased incentives for tradable commodities, it 
is of interest to distinguish them from the price evolution in non-tradables. Even though, as in 
most African countries, relatively little large-scale international private food trade takes place 
(even if the markets become liberalised), there is a very active market in most food crops, 
especially cereals. Internal market liberalisation provides further incentives for trade in these 
commodities. From the point of the view of the village economy, it would appear appropriate to 
include those actively traded commodities as tradables. Non-tradables include commodities 
rarely moved across any large distances, mainly because of high transactions costs due to a low 
value in relation to weight and volume. In our data, these include root crops such as enset and 
sweet potatoes. Finally, I also report the relative price movement of the crops that were liable to 
quotas in each community. The abolition of the quota is likely to have an additional effect 
beyond the overall pattern in prices. 
 
The results are generally consistent with the earlier predictions; Gara Godo appears to be an 
exception and will be discussed below. The abolition of the quota system and market reform 
appear to have resulted in increases in real producer prices: they have increased on average by 
about 26 percent. The increases are higher for those crops that used to be covered by the quota 
system, compared to other crops typically traded. As was discussed before, the predicted effect 
of the abolition of the quota system is ambiguous, while surplus areas are likely to have 
benefited from the liberalisation of regional trade. The national evidence pointed to higher 
producer prices in surplus areas. Quota crops were generally selected on the basis of predicted 
surpluses, so that the results in table 10 are consistent with this. Incentives for non-tradable 
crops have strongly decreased, in line with an increased market-orientation after liberalisation. 
Prices moved quite differently in Gara Godo. Located in a densely populated area, with overall 
relatively good road linkages, liberalisation appears to have brought down producer prices. 
Contrary to the other villages, most of whom are in or not far from surplus areas, it is a deficit 
area. The decline is less for the main cereals relative to non-tradables, but still substantial. 
                                                            
4 Data used are for 1989 and for 1994. It could be argued that these may be ‘exceptional’ years, so that these price 
changes do not reflect genuine permanent movements, but rather transitory differences. A systematic comparison 
for longer periods was not feasible due to gaps in the data between 1990 and 1993, while the Census of 1994/95 
stopped producer price data collection until late 1995. Still, an inspection of the available data suggests that the 
change is systematic and took effect at least after 1992. It also means that the usual problem of expectations and 
lag structure when analysing supply response is of less relevance.   9 
Terms of trade for coffee, traditionally an important cash crop in the area, moved very 
favourably, partly influenced by the coffee-boom of 1994-95, but also benefiting from the 
devaluation. However, in the real producer prices faced by the households in the sample this is 
not reflected, simply because a virtual harvest failure occurred in 1994 due to pests and drought 
at a crucial point in the growth cycle
5. Finally, chat, another important export crop in Ethiopia, 
is quite important in Adele Keke, but its terms of trade actually fell in the period 1989-94. As 
discussed before, this crop was rarely traded via the official channels and therefore its price has 
generally reflected the black market exchange rate, so that the devaluation has had little impact. 
Increased production and reduced rents from smuggling may well have depressed the prices 
somewhat. Still, it leaves these prices in real terms at about three times the levels of the early 
1980s.   
 
Table 3   Real producer prices (Percentage increases relative to 1989
a) 









All  crops  +28 +21  +12 +65 -37  +35  +26 
Quota crops
b  +29 +20  +15 +74 -22  n.a.  - 
Tradables
c  +28 +23  +15 +65 -12  +49  +31 
Non-tradables
d  - - -38  -  -77  -23  - 
Food  +31 +21  +25 +65 -37  +35  +28 
Coffee         +49     
Chat     -9         
Source: ERHS and Central Statistical Authority 
aPercentage changes in terms of trade, based on the movement of producer prices relative to consumption price 
inflation. The producer prices for different crops are weighted using the contribution to total crop income in 1994 
of each crop (including production for home consumption). The reported figures are based on the producer price 
indexes, averaged across households in each community and across the sample. Producer prices for all indexes 
were taken from publications on rural producer prices at the sub-regional level, collected by the Central Statistical 
Authority.  To achieve maximum comparability, only consumer prices collected by the Central Statistical 
Authority were used as well. Data were compiled for the same months so that differences do not reflect 
seasonality.   
bQuota crops: only using crops for which a quota had to be sold to the AMC. 
cTradables: regularly traded food and cash crops in Ethiopia, i.e. most cereals and cash crops. 
dNon-tradables: crops such as enset and sweet potatoes. 
 
A central question in much of the debate about the effects of market reform and increased 
incentives is whether farm households are actually responding to the changes in real producer 
prices. In Dercon (2001) this question in more detail. First, households switched away from the 
quota crops, suggesting that the system encouraged sub-optimal production choices. Area 
allocated to cash crop generally expanded. For example, quite a few farmers in Gara Godo 
planted new coffee. Chat did not expand much further in these villages, in line with the 
stabilisation of the price. 
 
As was argued before, direct measures of price changes for non-agricultural activities are not 
readily available. However, since most of the off-farm activities are linked to agriculture, price 
changes may well have gone in the same direction. In any case, there is evidence that more 
households became involved in off-farm activities (Dercon (2001)). The expansion is largest 
                                                            
5 Later rounds of the panel survey in subsequent years not used in this paper have shown an important recovery in 
coffee output in this area.    10 
for casual wage labour and especially crafts for sale and trading. There is also a move away 
from basic gathering activities to activities requiring more investment and skill.  
 
In conclusion, growth and poverty reduction appears to have taken place in most of these 
villages, but not all. In general, real producer prices have increased substantially on average, 
but the pattern is not the same for all crops and for all villages. However, the changes are 
consistent with expected food price changes after liberalisation and the effect of the 
devaluation, given widespread parallel markets. Next, the question arises whether the relation 
between growth, reforms and poverty can be understood or whether it is spurious. 
 
4. Decomposing growth and poverty changes: methodology 
 
In this section I develop a framework to assess to what extent these changes in welfare can be 
attributed to the economic reforms that have taken place, rather than, say, to climatic conditions 
or idiosyncratic shocks faced by the household. Reforms affect household incomes and 
consumption by changing prices and wages in the economy. They may also be affected by 
changes in availability of public goods or direct transfers. There is little evidence of changes in 
transfers or public goods during the period under consideration, so I will not consider this issue 
in the econometric analysis.  
 
Decomposing income changes 
 
Household net incomes can be seen as total returns to the different assets and endowments the 
household owns or has access to. They include land, labour, human capital and local 
endowments, such as agricultural potential and infrastructure. These assets are applied to a 
typically diversified portfolio of activities, possibly with some other inputs, such as fertiliser in 
agriculture or string to tie firewood before sale. Most activities are business activities – running 
a farm or off-farm activities - with close links to the farm, such as selling local beer or 
livestock products. As will be shown below, (virtually) all households in the sample have 
access to some land. Relatively little income is derived from wages or transfers. At the same 
time, little labour tends to be hired in or out, while land sales are prohibited. To simplify the 
analysis, one can think of the problem as the household trying to allocate some fixed and 
variable inputs to produce output and profit. The fixed inputs coincide with the household’s 
endowments (such as land, land quality, labour or human capital) and their presence is 
equivalent to assuming missing markets for these production factors, while some inputs such as 
fertiliser or seeds are bought.  
 
The approach assumes that different household activities, including non-farm and farm 
activities, can be considered as being described by one production process producing some 
composite good. While in agricultural economic analysis, this approach is not uncommon when 
considering total farm output, it may be more problematic when applied to all household 
income generating activities. However, as will be discussed below further, most non-farm 
activities appear closely linked to the farm output as well, so that the approach is less 
problematic than may seem at first.  
 
In order to separate out the effects of changing relative prices in the economy, as part of the 
reform program, I use a profit function approach, with a simple underlying production function   11 
to represent the household’s allocation of inputs (Singh et al. (1986), De Janvry et al. (1995)).  
Since we have panel data, the standard problem of the lack of variation in prices to estimate 
price responsiveness is avoided. Also, since we do not have good data on all output and income 
sources, estimating a profit function allows us still to make inference on the overall effects of 
the reforms on production. At the same time, heterogeneity across households can be addressed 
via panel data, at least under certain assumptions about the form of heterogeneity.  
 
Let the household’s joint income generation process be described by q=g(x,k,u), in which q is 
total output, x is a vector of n variable inputs, k is a vector of j fixed inputs and u is a vector of 
m stochastic factors, such as agro-climatic conditions. Risk is introduced as a factor in the 
production function. The household is assumed to maximise profits from its activities
6. The 
maximisation problem can be simply written as: 
 
 x p ) u , k , x ( g . p Y max
x
x
− =  (1) 
 
in which p is the output price and p
x are input prices. 
 
The optimal x can be substituted back into the objective function to define the profit function Y 
as a function of input and output prices, fixed factors and exogenous shocks.  If one assumes 




straightforward manipulation yields a profit function, defined as: 
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Taking logs, a useful form for empirical analysis emerges as: 
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For further manipulation, using subscripts i to denote different households and introducing a 
household-specific effect δi for each household i, (3) can written as: 
 
 















i i i u ln k ln p ln p ln a ln Y ln  (4) 
                                                            
6Note that this implies that, to keep the analysis tractable and simple, recursivity is assumed between consumption 
and production. In general, this is not easily justified since it is clear that many markets are imperfect in Ethiopia, 
including land, credit and insurance markets. The reasons include the standard theoretical ones, as well as, such as 
in the case of land, extensive restrictions for political purposes, which will be discussed below. The nature of food 
market interventions may also have implied a breakdown of recursivity as will be discussed further. In the 
econometric analysis, the fact that panel data are used allows, heterogeneity across households to be addressed, 
including in (shadow) prices, so that the recursivity assumption is less restrictive than it may seem.   12 
 
When comparing incomes over time after a period of reform, a number of elements in (4) may 
have changed. First, reform is likely to affect input and output prices, affecting incomes. 
Secondly, households may have expanded or reduced some of their fixed inputs. For example, 
the available labour or human capital may have changed. Thirdly, over a number of years, there 
may have been some changes in the technology employed, encouraged by the reforms. More 
realistically, since the model assumes the production of one composite commodity, relative 
output and input price changes may have induced a shift in the optimal portfolio, implying 
some changes in the optimal technology used (such as more intensive in some variable or fixed 
production factors)
7.  Finally, the shock variables are likely to take on different values. 
Allowing for these different possible changes, considering periods t and t+1 as respectively 
before and after the reforms, and denoting ∆ as the difference in values between t+1 and t, 
differences in profits over time can be described as: 
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1 jt u ln u ln k ln k ln  (5) 
  
Introducing an error term and estimating (5) provides estimators of the different elasticities 
relative to prices and changes in fixed inputs, controlling for heterogeneity in the form of 
household fixed effects. At the same time, an estimate is obtained for any changes in these 
elasticities over time due changes in the underlying technology of combining inputs. Equation 
(5) allows one to distinguish the effects of changing prices from changes in the household 
endowments and from shocks faced by the household. Provided that price changes can be 
linked to the reform programme, this allows a direct assessment of whether any observed 
changing income levels can be traced to the reforms. A simple means of presenting these 
results is to calculate using the estimates from (5) the contribution of each of the these factors 
to explaining mean income changes, similar to a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca 
(1973), Blinder (1973)). In particular, (5) can be summed for all i, and each term then divided 
by the sum of changes in log incomes. When (5) is estimated using a method imposing that the 
expected error term is zero (such as OLS), this provides an exact decomposition. 
 
Linking poverty and growth - simulating the impact of variables 
 
The analysis described above allows us to see the contributions of different factors to changes 
in the mean levels of real income. However, in this paper, our interest is not just to explain 
growth in incomes but also how the poor fared in this context. In particular, I am interested in 
trying to establish the contribution of different observed factors to the change in poverty over 
time. This is not self-evident. A poverty index is in general not a linear function of real 
incomes; consequently, changes in real incomes are not linearly related to changes in poverty. 
For example, the poverty gap index is for each poor individual linear in real incomes, but non-
linear as an aggregate measure. When considering changes over time via particular factors, the 
group of poor and non-poor may change as well, so that there is no simple, exact way to link 
                                                            
7Note that this allows for changes over time in the marginal value product of particular fixed factors beyond 
changes brought about by changes in prices of output and variable inputs.    13 
the effects of growth to the effects on poverty
8.  The standard approach to study the effects of 
changes over time of particular factors on poverty is to construct the counterfactual real income 
distribution (via micro-simulations) and then to calculate the difference in the poverty indicator 
between the original and the counterfactual distribution. In section 7, we will use this approach 
to investigate the specific individual contributions of different factors on the changes in poverty 
during the period under consideration.  
 
However, it is possible to derive a simple analytical result that describes the calculations one 
implements during such micro-simulation exercise given the questions asked in this paper. In 
principle, any counterfactual can be simulated and its impact assessed on any poverty index. 
However, suppose we are specifically interested in investigating the contribution to poverty 
changes of some variables crucial in explaining growth.  Since (5) considered changes in the 
natural logarithm in income, let us use a poverty index that is defined in log income as well. 
Furthermore, let us consider an additive separable poverty index, which for the each poor 
person is linear in log incomes. The normalised poverty gap, defined over the log of income as 
the underlying household welfare measure, satisfies this property
9.  
 
Formally, denote lnYit as yit, z as the log of the poverty line, qt as the number of people falling 
below the poverty line in the current period and n as the total number of individuals which are 
all observed over time
10. If we order all individuals from poor to rich in each period, then this 
measure can be defined as: 
 











P    (6) 
 
Let us consider two periods of time, 0 and 1, and introduce a specific counterfactual, in which 
the change of income over time is equal to Xi. For example, this could be the change in real 
income stemming from the actual change in one of the fixed endowments in (5), or Xi = 
ij
*
1 jt k ln ∆ β + . It is then possible to calculate the counterfactual real income for person i, yi1
*, as:  
 
   i 0 i
*
1 i X y y + =  (7)
  
 
Given this change, the number of poor will change. It is possible that some become poor and 
others escape poverty. Let us call the actual and counterfactual number of poor in period 0 and 
                                                            
8 Datt and Ravallion (1992) developed a simple approximate decomposition in growth and distribution effects of 
changes in poverty - however this is not an exact decomposition, while the contribution of different factors cannot 
directly derived from the decomposition. 
9 By using lnY, the result is effectively the same as when using the Watts measure. Since the poverty gap is more 
commonly used in discussions of changes in poverty, I state the problem in terms of this index. In the econometric 
analysis, I will also present results on a linear (rather than log-linear) profit function defined in terms of Y rather 
than lnY. While the theoretical foundations for such profit function is weaker (one could think of it as a Leontief 
model but without most of the interaction terms), it provides a poverty change decomposition directly defined over 
the standard poverty gap measure, defined in terms of the level of income. The Watts poverty measure is defined 
over the log of Y, so it is a natural candidate to use in the decomposition. 
10 In this exposition, I do not consider attrition in the panel. As is discussed below, in the data set used, attrition 
rates were very low in the period considered.    14 
1 respectively q0 and q1
*. We can then define the change in poverty between period 1 and 0 as: 
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Let us now order the individuals, so that the poor in both periods are from i=1,... q
*
11, those 




01 (i.e. non-poor in period 0 and poor in period 1), those 




10, and finally, those non-poor in each period as 
i=q
*
10+1,…n.  Then, (8) can be written as: 
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i.e. the change in the gap consist of the change of the gap of those poor in both periods, plus the 
gap of those poor in the second but not in the first period, minus the gap in the first period of 
those leaving poverty
11. Dividing the left and right hand side of (9) by (P1
*-P0) yields a 
decomposition in terms of the contribution to the total poverty change of those staying poor, 
those becoming poor and those leaving poverty. Note that this is an exact decomposition.  
 
This can be rewritten in terms of changes in real income. The part in brackets in the first term 
of (9) is directly defined in terms of yi1
*- yi0  = Xi. We can also pre-multiply the terms within the 
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 (11) 
 
This expression suggests (rather self-evidently) that when calculating the total counterfactual 
poverty change, for households who leave or enter into poverty, only the real income change up 
to or counting from the poverty line will be taken into account, while for those staying poor, 
their entire real income change is relevant.  This allows us to define the share of the real income 
change that has to be taken into account as: 
                                                            
11 As suggested earlier and using the notation as before, the Watts poverty measure is defined as: 








so that the decomposition in (8) is in practice a decomposition of the Watts poverty measure. Just as the squared 
poverty gap, it is convex in levels of real income, implying that income levels far below the poverty line have a 
higher weight than levels closer to the poverty line, unlike the poverty gap, which is linear in levels of income.  




i =     for qi∈ {1,…q*11}, (13a) 
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=    for qi∈ {q*01+1,…,q*10} (13c) 
 
Note that these shares si* are dependent on the specific counterfactual studied (i.e. they are 
endogenous). Furthermore, they are all between zero and one. 
 

















= −  (14) 
 
Equation (14) is only of limited interest: if only one factor is considered in the counterfactual, 
the equation only describes what in practice is calculated via simulations. Calculating the 
weights si* is probably more time consuming than calculating the change in poverty directly 
from the derived and the actual distribution. Furthermore, (14) is restricted to very specific 
poverty measures, while micro-simulations can handle any measure. Nevertheless, (14) 
becomes more interesting when X is itself determined by different variables. 
 
 
Simulating and decomposing the impact of a group of variables 
 
Consider a counterfactual that consists of two parts (V and W), and assume that for each i, Xi 
=Vi + Wi.  Now (10) can be used to study the contribution of each factor Vi and Wi in the total 
counterfactual change. For a given total change in real income (i.e. for a given total 





























= −  (15) 
 
This implies that for a given total change, the contribution of different factors to the change in 
poverty can be written derived from (15). In particular the contribution of factor Vi given total 























=  (16) 
 
Note that these contributions sum to one, but also that they are always defined relative to a 
particular total counterfactual change. For example, let us define P1
V (P1
W) as poverty in period 
1 when V (W) has been added to yi0. Even though (yi0 + Xi) = (yi0 + Vi + Wi), it can be easily   16 
seen that: 
 






1 − + − ≠ −  (17) 
    
In other words, the total poverty change due to adding V and W both to real income is not 
simply equal to the poverty change induced by adding V and W separately. Obviously, this 
means that the decomposition has to be carefully interpreted. (15) and (16) will be used below 
to interpret the contribution to poverty changes of different elements linked to economic 
reform.  
 
Linking poverty and growth - an overall assessment 
 
The decomposition described above provides a simple way of assessing the contribution of 
different factors to a particular counterfactual poverty change. One counterfactual is of 
particular interest for the current research: assessing the contribution of different factors to the 
actual observed total change in poverty (P1-P0). With an appropriate residual term (εi), equation 
(5) provides a prediction model for changes in real income for each person, based on different 
factors. Or, more in general, suppose Xi = Vi + Wi + εi. Equation (14) can then be rewritten as 






































= −  (18) 
 
Equation (18) provide then simple ways of describing the contribution of these different factors 
(and the error term) to the observed poverty changes, using shares si based on the actual 
observed poverty transitions.  
 
Equation (18) shows a direct link between changes in individual incomes over time and the 
poverty outcome.  Furthermore, replacing the income change by the predicted contribution of 
different factors using (5) and dividing each term by the total poverty change gives the 
contribution of these factors to the change in poverty. For example, let θ∆pi be the contribution 
of changes in output prices to the total poverty change and θ∆ki be the contribution to the total 
poverty change of changes in particular endowments k, then using (5) and (18), they are 
defined as:   
 
 












































The overall result is a decomposition of the poverty gap into the effects of changes in fixed 
endowments, changes in input and output prices, and random events, for a given total change 
in poverty. The decomposition will now be applied to data related to 1989 and 1994/95, before   17 
and after a major set of reform measures was implemented. The decomposition of income 
changes in (5) is exact when using an estimation method which impose that that the sum of the 
residuals is zero, such as OLS. But the proposed decomposition is done on a sub-sample only, 
so that this property does not hold. Consequently, decompositions based on (18) are not exact 
and the contribution of the error term will have to be added:  
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5. Econometric model and results 
 
In this section, the econometric model discussed in section 4 will be used to explain the 
changes in welfare between 1989 en 1995. The estimates will then be used in the next section 
to conduct a decomposition of mean welfare and poverty changes. The main issue is to 
establish whether reforms rather than other factors can explain the observed changes. 
Introducing an error term et+1, equation (5) can be rewritten as an econometric model 
explaining changes in real income over time in terms of the change in the output price, input 
prices, fixed input changes and shocks, such as rainfall or idiosyncratic events. Since structural 
change in the technology used during this period is plausible, due to reorganisation of the 
activity portfolio, changes in the coefficients are also allowed for. A general change in total 
factor productivity (i.e. technological progress) is measured by a change in the constant in the 
underlying production function. The result is equation (20): 
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Since this is not a standard difference model, a few comments on the econometric implications 
of (20) are useful. By estimating this difference model by OLS, one effectively controls for 
fixed (level) effects, i.e. household heterogeneity in the profit function, despite the fact that 
equation (20) includes terms in levels of prices and inputs.  Household heterogeneity is 
typically an important problem in estimating profit or production functions, since many 
relevant variables to explain a household's outcomes remain typically unmeasured and may be 
correlated with some of the observed variables. For example, ability as a farmer is likely to 
matter but unobserved as well as possible correlated with other observed variables, biasing the 
estimates on some variables included in the regression. If it is a fixed effect, a difference model 
will produce unbiased estimates on those variables that change over time. However, it can be 
straightforwardly shown that the coefficients on variables that do not change over time but are 
included in the model to capture changes in coefficients, do not benefit from this property, i.e. 
they may still be biased. In fact, the estimated coefficients in (20) will be exactly the same as 
the difference of the coefficients if they would have been estimated using the level equation (4) 
and using OLS, for each year independently. Nevertheless, estimating them in (20) will be 
more efficient (Glewwe and Hall (1994)). 
   18 
Using (20) on the data requires careful justifications for the inclusion of the right hand side 
variables. First, land and labour supply available to the household will be considered as fixed 
inputs, meaning that labour and land markets are assumed missing. As was discussed before, 
land is a non-tradable in Ethiopia. Land is state owned and allocated to peasants by a local 
council, who cannot buy or sell it. Land rental was illegal until the 1990s, but even afterwards 
cultivated land and land owned remain closely correlated
12. Wage labour, whether in agriculture 
or otherwise, remains relatively rare. Rural wage labour markets remain underdeveloped, even 
though probably increasing compared to the repression of this activity before 1989. Informal 
labour transactions take nevertheless place in the village, in the form of labour sharing 
arrangements (‘debbo’ or ‘wenfel’). However, these arrangements are largely reciprocal, so 
own labour remains the basis of these transactions, limiting the scope for relative factor 
equalising trade within villages.  
 
Consequently, and for simplicity, both factors are therefore considered fixed. Labour 
considered will include male and female adults and children
13. Land holdings are not 
homogenous across the sample. There are substantial differences in soil fertility and 
agricultural potential within and across communities. Information from the survey is used to 
control for these differences. Changes in land and labour availability allow us to estimate the 
coefficients in (20), which are directly linked to marginal returns. I assume that soil fertility and 
potential has not changed in this period: while they may well have been changing over longer 
periods of time, in a five-year period, this is unlikely to be very important. In any case, no 
information is available to control for this.   
 
Another fixed input considered is location and infrastructure, proxied by the presence and 
quality of roads and distances to urban centres. In community surveys any changes in road 
presence and quality were investigated, but in these communities and period, changes reported 
were limited. Consequently, these variables are only included to investigate changes in their 
returns during this period, without establishing the information necessary to calculate marginal 
returns to roads and distance from towns.  
 
The most direct result of the reform programme appears to have been the changes in 
agricultural output prices, with improving terms of trade for five out of six communities 
considered. This price change will be included in the analysis. Crop related income is however 
not the only source of income: the estimated value of the harvest contributed only about 43 
percent to total income in 1994. Even though this is likely to have been an underestimate of the 
true relevance of crop income, non-crop income, such as business income or livestock product 
sales are also important. Unfortunately, no price information is available on these other 
sources. Nevertheless, I want to argue that this is not a serious shortcoming in the current 
                                                            
12Before 1989, any form of land rental was also illegal, with some exceptions related to widows, disabled people 
or families of serving soldiers. Sharecropping is relatively widespread and the simple set-up of the regressions 
does really account for this, except for considering it as one part of the portfolio of activities to allocate land and 
labour to, given relative endowments and prices faced. Although the number of sharecropping transactions are 
relatively high – in the cereal farming system villages up to 20 percent engaging in it – the land areas involved 
remain relatively small. For example, the correlation between household land holdings suitable for cultivation and 
actual land size cultivated per household (after transactions) is above 90 percent.  
13Children are considered from the age of five upwards. In the survey, it was found that children performed a 
variety of farm and non-farm related activities. Gross primary school enrolment rates in 1994 were only about 20 
percent.   19 
context. On the one hand, most of these activities involve substantial inputs from local crop 
agriculture – such the raw materials for much of the petty food trade or food processing. The 
movement in producer terms of trade would suggest that these products also gained similar 
amounts relative to other traded consumer goods. The producer terms of trade changes would 
then capture the increased returns quite well. On the other hand, since these activities typically 
involve some trading with urban areas, the shadow output may well be proxied by inclusion of 
infrastructure and distance variables, as in our specification.  Although very few purchased 
inputs tend to be used in both farm and off-farm activities, they should also be included. Again, 
no data are available on this. Nevertheless, since they tend to be supplied via nearby urban 
centres, the relative movement of these input prices may well be captured via the inclusion of 
the infrastructure and distance variables. 
 
The result is a reduced-form specification in which agricultural output prices, infrastructure and 
distance variables allow the identification of a direct effect of the reform policies on real 
incomes via price changes. Changes in labour and land allow us to identify the marginal 
(physical) products underlying the production process. The levels of these fixed inputs at t+1 
provide us with evidence on any changes in the marginal products, that affect the marginal 
return to inputs beyond price changes (see equations (3) and (4) for this). This may seem 
problematic, since it suggests that the underlying production technology has changed. 
Nevertheless, a reform programme, by changing the overall incentive structure for both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities, may well have affected the relative (physical) 
returns to land, labour and infrastructure. This could have been achieved via a more efficient 
use of resources, in response to the lifting restrictions on crop choice (via the quota system) or 
increasing mobility, beyond those measured by price changes
14. Furthermore, given that the 
left-hand side variable is effectively a composite commodity, consisting of farm and non-farm 
activities, shifts in the production function may be a reflection of a relative shift of the 
composition of the activities. For example, if reforms mainly restore the returns to agriculture, 
then crop-related activities may become relatively more important in the portfolio of activities 
in terms of the allocation of time and other inputs. This would result in a higher contribution of 
land to profits, linked to an increase in its marginal product.   
 
Observed changes in real income are likely to have been affected by both common and 
idiosyncratic shocks as well.  Ideally, detailed information on these should have been used, but 
much detail was missing from the 1989 survey. Nevertheless, two key variables are available: 
rainfall, both long-term changes and changes in the last year, and episodes of serious adult 
illness in the period between the two survey rounds
15. The latter is likely to be the most 
important type of idiosyncratic shock
16. Controlling for such shocks is crucial for a correct 
interpretation of the effects of policy, since marginal returns to land and labour are bound to be 
sensitive to shocks.   
 
The result is an econometric model that explains changes in the log of real income (i.e. the 
                                                            
14Any changes in the returns to roads and distances may also be linked to the effects of the return to peace. 
15 The question on illness asked in 1994 whether any household member had suffered a serious, life-threatening 
illness in the last five years. Length of illness was also asked. 
16 Dercon and Krishnan (2000a) report that shocks to labour supply, such illness and death of household have very 
important effects on welfare in rural Ethiopia. About 40 percent of households in the Ethiopian Rural Household 
Survey mentioned it as a cause of serious hardship in the last twenty years, after harvest failure, mainly due to 
drought (78 percent) and the policy measures of the Dergue (42 percent).   20 
growth between t and t+1) in terms of changes in fixed endowments and changes in their 
returns, changing real prices and common and idiosyncratic shocks. Let us define pit
a as 
agricultural output prices and Tit as labour available in year t. Lit is land available in year t, I
k
it 
is a vector of k location and/or infrastructure characteristics in year t. ∆lnSi is the illness shock 
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Another issue is an appropriate proxy for real income (the left-hand side variable). As was 
mentioned before, income was not very well measured in the survey, especially when 
concerned with comparing incomes over time. Consumption, at least for food, was much more 
carefully and consistently measured. This presents both problems and opportunities. First, 
consumption is hardly the same as income as a concept when measuring returns. However, 
since it is likely to be less sensitive to current circumstances, it will be more a reflection of the 
household’s perceived typical return to its own assets and endowments. By the same token, to 
the extent that we do not measure well all the shocks and events affecting the household, 
consumption will also provide a better measure to assess the impact of reforms on living 
standards. Food consumption is typically a very high share of total consumption – in 1994 close 
to 80 percent, so using only food consumption is unlikely to be a large omission. Furthermore, 
since the income elasticity of non-food items is likely to be higher than those for basic food 
items, using food consumption will again underestimate the true response to reforms (although 
admittedly also to shocks, such as rainfall). Overall, therefore, using food consumption is 
unlikely to fundamentally affect linking data on the reforms to outcomes. If anything, it biases 
the results against any impact of the reforms, in favour of an interpretation linked to shocks. By 
using consumption in (21), the link with a welfare interpretation becomes more 
straightforward. Furthermore, a decomposition of poverty defined more appropriately in terms 
of consumption, rather than income, can be then performed.  
 
Table 4 gives the estimation results, while table 5 gives the decomposition. Six different 
specifications are considered
17. Each model is a difference model, allowing for fixed effects. 
Mean values are given in the last column. The left-hand side variable is the change in the log of 
real consumption, which can be viewed as the five-year growth rate. Consequently, the 
regression gives the contribution of different variables to the consumption growth. Recall that 
estimated coefficients right-hand variables in terms of differences will give the coefficients 
explaining real income in 1994/95, while coefficients on level variables in 1989 will give the 
increase in these coefficients since 1989. Growth between 1989 and 1994 is therefore allowed 
to come from increases in endowments and prices, and increases in the returns relative to 1989, 
                                                            
17 All variables, except for dummies, are expressed in logs. Since some variables have zero values in the sample, 1 
was added to those variables involved. The exception is land, where only 0.1 was added, in line with the 
suggestion in Pendgrist (1986). They suggested that the bias involved in adding arbitrary constants can be large, 
especially if the constant added is close to the mean value of the variable. As a simple means of investigating this 
in the current sample, regressions were repeated for samples without zero values for particular variables. In the 
case of land, if 1 was added, coefficients on land and on other variables were very different compared to a sample 
excluding landless households in 1989. If 0.1 was added, virtually identical coefficients were returned.    21 
controlling for shocks.  
 
The first specification uses fixed village level effects, i.e. all village level variables (e.g. prices) 
are perfectly captured by a set of dummies. The model includes land holdings and an index of 
land quality. It is a subjective index, scaled relative to the village level mean
18. Three types of 
labour available are considered: male and female adults (above 15) and children above the age 
of 5. The model also uses average years of education of adults. Note that on average 
educational levels are extremely low, below one year per adult. They are assumed not to have 
changed between 1989 and 1994, so that only the change in the returns is measured
19. The 
model also includes an idiosyncratic shock: the average number of serious adult illness 
episodes between 1989 and 1994 per adult in the family
20. The results show significant effects 
on changes in land holdings and levels of land in 1989, and on some of the fixed effects. The 
land variables imply that growth is partly explained by some increases in total land holdings in 
some villages (21 percent of total growth, see table 18), but also by an increase in the marginal 
product of land since 1989, with an additional effect for those with higher soil quality. This can 
be understood as a shift in the income portfolio towards more land-intensive activities, i.e. 
agriculture, in line with the incentives provided by the reform process: household income is 
now produced by a more land-intensive technology, with a higher growth effect for households 
with better land. The education effect is low and not significant. Recall that educational levels 
are extremely low in this sample, so that the total contribution to growth is very small
21. The 
largest effect comes from village fixed effects, suggesting that relative prices and changes in 
the returns to local conditions dominate overall growth (98 percent). Illness shocks are 
negative, and even though not significant, they reduced average growth by 11 percent.  
Household labour composition does not appear to matter significantly in this specification. It 
appears however that the different labour variables could be taken together: a test of a linear 
restriction stating equality of coefficients on the level and changes in labour could not be 
rejected (F(4,337)=0.19). Alternative specifications with total household size or adult 
equivalent units (as used in the previous sections) gave very similar results, so from column 2 
the labour variables are restricted to one measure in terms of adult equivalent units
22. As 
expected, the results show a positive effect on changes in labour, explaining 7 percent of total 
growth. Although insignificant, it appears that the technology used in 1994 is less labour 
intensive, reducing the marginal returns of labour and contributing minus 34 percent to the 
growth. This is consistent with the shift towards more land-intensive activities. Note that if the 
reforms aimed to stimulate more labour-intensive rural production, then this is not achieved. 
Also, if the poor have typically more labour than other assets this would have contributed to a 
relatively low poverty elasticity of the growth process in this period.   
 
                                                            
18Households were asked to categorise their land according to three local well-known concepts of land quality 
(‘lem’, ‘lem-teuf’ and ‘teuf’), equivalent to good, medium and poor quality. The meaning of each of the three is 
unlikely to be comparable across widely varying farming systems, but within villages likely to be consistent. 
19 By lack of data on education in 1989, the 1994 values are assumed to be valid for 1989. This is unlikely to be a 
problem, given the low enrolment rates in Ethiopia (by 1994, gross primary enrolment was only about 20 percent) 
and the collapse of the educational system by the end of the 1990s). 
20 Serious illness shocks were defined as life-threatening illness episodes, affecting the individual for a 
considerable length of time. Recall was used in 1994 to collect information about all adults in this respect. 
21 A few other educational variables were tried as well, such as literacy or whether any household member has 
education. In none of the specifications used were these terms significant. 
22 Strictly speaking, the F-test reported suggests a multiplicative labour term, not an additive term (such as 
household size). Results remained similar, while the interpretation is more straightforward when adding up adults.   22 
In the next four columns, price and community level information is added. In model 3, the 
percentage change crop producer prices is added (see table 10 for details). It was constructed to 
reflect changes in household price incentives, so the community fixed effects can remain. 
Given the presence of the fixed effects, its significance (at 7 percent) is encouraging. Its 
coefficient directly measures price responsiveness, i.e. the output elasticity is the coefficient 
minus one. However, the value of 0.55 has to be interpreted with caution. Since household real 
income is more than just crops, it could be compared with the share of crop income in total 
income. In 1994 this was 43 percent, suggesting that an aggregate crop output elasticity of 
about 28 percent (0.55/0.43). Nevertheless, since it was shown before that many other activities 
are closely related to crops and their prices may have similarly moved, this must be seen as an 
upper bound. In any case, the average producer price increase, clearly linked to the reforms, 
mattered: about 39 percent of total growth is explained by it. 
 
Since the different land variables appear to be having very similar effects, column 4 introduces 
a further restriction by using ‘augmented’ land as a variable, i.e. the product of the land and the 
soil variable, further multiplied by a control variable for ‘agricultural potential’. Since land and 
(on the basis of the available information) soil cannot easily compared across areas in terms of 
potential (both physical and monetary), a variable measuring this was added to model 4
23. A 
linear restriction on the three land variables was then found not to be rejected (F(2,340)=0.01), 
so augmented land was used subsequently. Note that all variables have similar effects in the 
decomposition as before. 
 
In column 5 and 6, the community fixed effects are replaced by rainfall, infrastructure and 
location variables. The particular variables were chosen to give explanatory power to the 
regression but provided that they did not changed the effects and contribution of the household 
level variables. In particular, since fixed effects capture perfectly community level prices and 
conditions, any substantive change in the other coefficients would suggest missing community 
level variables. Nevertheless, the results will have to be interpreted with caution since there is 
evidence of multicollinearity between community characteristics and only limited scope for 
introducing information in the regression (given only six different communities). 
 
                                                            
23 It was constructed as log of the village-level average yield per hectare times the village-level unit value per kg in 
1989, scaled by the mean. The result in that mean potential (just as mean soil quality) in the sample is one for the 
mean household. Mean augmented land holdings are then equal to actual land holdings.   23 
Table 4  Econometric model real income function. Dependent variable: change in log consumption between 1989 and 1994 (mean 0.3733; N=354). Robust standard errors corrected for village cluster effects. 
  Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5  Model  6   sample 
  Coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value Coeff p-value coeff p-value mean 
Constant  0.23 0.37 0.26 0.27 -0.11 0.68 0.00 0.99 0.18 0.15      1.000 
ln(land in 89 ha +0.1)  0.21  0.13  0.21  0.17  0.21  0.17              0.294 
ln(soil  quality)  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.21  0.23  0.20         -0.041 
ln(augmented  land)         0.21  0.13  0.20  0.11  0.19  0.11  0.160 
∆ ln (land in ha + 0.1)  0.24 0.04 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.24 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.327 
ln(adults  in  89)      -0.08 0.19 -0.08 0.24 -0.08 0.30 -0.06 0.46      1.549 
∆ ln (adult equiv.)      0.30 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.32 0.23 0.35 0.21 0.091 
ln(male  ad.  89+1)  -0.02  0.96             0.797 
ln(fem  ad  in  89+1)  -0.07  0.78             0.864 
ln(children  89+1)  -0.04  0.81             1.379 
∆ ln (male adults+1)  0.25  0.26             0.176 
∆ ln (fem adults+1)  0.02  0.89             0.133 
∆ ln (children+1)  0.14  0.55             -0.087 
ln(yrs  adult  educ+1)  0.01 0.97 0.01 0.96 0.03 0.88 0.03 0.88 0.01 0.96 0.01 0.96 0.202 
ln(adults  serious  ill+1)  -0.22 0.36 -0.22 0.37 -0.22 0.37 -0.22 0.38 -0.20 0.39 -0.19 0.43 0.188 
dummy  Dinki  -0.14 0.26 -0.17 0.14 0.04 0.78 0.55 0.07          0.150 
dummy  D.Berhan  0.16 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.37 0.05 0.03 0.80          0.175 
dummy  Adele  Keke  0.44 0.02 0.42 0.03 0.71 0.02 0.30 0.09          0.121 
dummy Gara Godo  -0.02  0.92  -0.06  0.78  0.48  0.20  0.52  0.01          0.155 
dummy  Domaa  0.58 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.24 0.38          0.144 
∆ (% real prod prices)          0.55 0.07 0.60 0.00 0.37 0.12 0.59 0.00 0.263 
∆ ln (rain last 5 years)           1.15  0.06     0.002 
∆ ln (rain last season)           0.22  0.45     -0.179 
∆ ln( rain 5 yrs*seas)             0.43  0.04  -0.177 
ln  (distance  to  town)           -0.24  0.21  -0.28  0.08  0.000 
Road  infrastructure?           0.17  0.40  0.27  0.03  0.706 
F joint  F(16,337) =2.73  F(13,341) =3.63  F(13,340) =3.54  F(12,341) =3.85  F(11,342) =4.15  F(9,345)= =10.59   
adj  R   0.072  0.082  0.085  0.088  0.089      
testing restrictions  labour levels  equal?          land terms equal?      constant, lnaeu89   
  F(2,337)=  0.01       F(2,340)=  0.01     F(2,344)=  1.03   
  Lab.  changes  equal?           rain  variables  equal?   
  F(2,337)=  0.74           F(1,344)=  1.30     24 
Table 5  Decomposition of real consumption growth in percentages.  
(Total change=37 percent) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
increase  in  land  0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 
increase in adult labour  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.09 
change in returns to land (technology shift)  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.09  0.08  0.08 
change in returns to labour (techn shift)  -0.32  -0.34  -0.31  -0.31  -0.24   
changes in returns to education of adults  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
crop producer prices change      0.39  0.41  0.26  0.42 
change returns to infrastructure/location          0.32  0.51 
relative  rainfall  shock       -0.10  -0.20 
effect  of  illness  shocks  -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 
village level effect  0.98  1.02  0.59  0.62     
constant  effect       0.49   
sum of all effects  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 
Since real consumption is used on the right hand side, measured outcomes reflect 
household strategies to cope with the consequences of risk, such as credit and savings. 
Any effect on rainfall variables, especially short-run rainfall, reflects therefore uninsured 
risk. Also, introducing long-term rainfall experience would become relevant: one year of 
poor rains may well be handled within the household via asset transactions, but several is 
much harder. Still, if household have generally difficulty to handle shocks, then more 
recent rainfall should matter as well for outcomes. Without further analysis on smoothing 
behaviour, it appears appropriate to consider both the short and long-term experience in 
rainfall. Consequently, I use relative rainfall in the most recent crop season comparing 
1994 with 1989, and the relative average rainfall in the five years preceding each survey 
round. In column 5, both are positive, but only long term rainfall appears significant. 
However, since the variables are highly correlated, introducing either gave significant 
outcomes at at least 6 percent, while a linear restriction imposing equality of both effects 
could not be rejected (F(1,344)=1.30). In column 6, this equality was imposed. 
 
For road infrastructure, the variable reported is whether the village has a road (either an 
all-weather road or a dirt road). Other finer distinctions were not significant. A measure 
of relative remoteness was constructed using the distance to the nearest town, scaled by 
the mean distance to the nearest town in the sample.  In column 5 they were both 
insignificant, but once further restrictions were tested and imposed (including on rainfall, 
but also dropping the constant and the number of adults in 1989, the latter both 
individually and jointly insignificant), they became strongly significant. 
 
Good rainfall typically boosts growth. In 1993/94, rains were as discussed before on 
average not as good as in 1988/89 (contrary to the national experience), even though 
slightly better in the most recent five years than before.  The overall result suggests that 
rainfall kept growth down by about a fifth. The effect on roads means that returns to 
infrastructure have strongly increased since 1989. Again, this suggests that reforms, by 
encouraging more trade-oriented activities, have contributed to growth, despite higher 
transport or traded input costs. Nevertheless, even though the war had not directly 
affected the villages concerned, this is also consistent with increased mobility of goods 
and people with increased security. Similarly, the effect on distance suggests that   25 
proximity to towns contributed positively to growth but remoteness negatively. The total 
contribution to growth of infrastructure and location is about 51 percent, underlying its 
importance in this period. 
 
In conclusion, according to our econometric decomposition, better returns to roads and to 
a lesser extent remoteness contributed the largest share to growth between 1989 and 
1994. As a consequence, the model predicts that those with poor location and no 
infrastructure would only have had half the growth rate of the others during this period of 
reform and return to peace. Better crop prices contributed also a very high share, 42 
percent, but recall that one village faced worse prices than before the reforms, explaining 
some of its poor record. Acquiring more fixed assets is obviously good: the increases in 
land holding (mainly in one village following the disbanding of the producer co-
operative) and more labour adds to real household income. However, their overall 
contribution in this period remains relatively small. Returns to education also appear to 
have increased considerably, but low average levels of education mean that only a small 
contribution is made in this period. An interesting finding is an increase in returns to land 
via its marginal product, suggesting a shift to a more land-intensive production mode. On 
average, the effect contributes only 8 percent to growth, but it means that those with more 
land will have seen higher growth rates. Furthermore, since this also includes an 
additional return to better soil quality and higher potential, this means that effects across 
the distribution may be larger: those in low potential areas or with relative poor soil 
would have had a lower growth rate from the same levels of land. In other words, any 
shift towards a more agricultural based production mode will have given disproportionate 
growth to farmers better-off in terms of land. Finally, poor rains and illness kept growth 
down by about a third.  
 
In annex 2, the robustness of the results were checked further in three ways. First, by 
using income rather than consumption, even if one is aware that there are problems with 
the collection of the income data. Secondly, by investigating whether there is any 
evidence of different responsiveness of the poor relative to the non-poor to the key 
variables. Finally, by changing the parametric estimation technique used to quantile 
regressions. As is discussed in the annex, the results are qualitatively unaffected. 
 
 
6.   Explaining real income changes of the poor 
 
Table 6 brings a large number of characteristics of the poor together, by their poverty status in 1989 and 
1994. Income and livestock changes are consistent with consumption for each group those poor in either 
period. The largest increases in land were for those becoming non-poor. Patterns in mean land holdings are 
consistent with poverty in each round. Those poor in both periods have least land. Chat is consistent with 
being non-poor and moving out of poverty by 1994, while coffee is not (recall that the village with coffee 
suffered a bad coffee harvest in 1994). Fertiliser use does appear to be strongly related to poverty: those 
moving out of poverty and the non-poor use are more likely to use more by 1994 than before. Livestock and 
business income has increased most for the non-poor, but the largest effect for those becoming non-poor is 
from higher crop income. Those becoming poor in 1994 suffered declines in crop incomes. The persistently 
poor and those becoming poor have seen the largest increases in labour supply within the 
household in terms of adults or adult equivalent. Most education can be found by those 
becoming non-poor, but the levels remain very low. Those remaining poor and those    26 
 
Table 6  Household characteristics by poverty transition (n=354) 









Outcomes  real food consumption per adult in 1989 (94 prices)  19.68  70.77  22.11  75.93  41.05 
 real food consumption per adult in 1994  21.99  26.39  104.81  111.16  64.62 
 real total gross income per adult per month in 1989  13.80  31.13  21.39  42.99  25.25 
 real total gross income per adult per month in 1994  25.55  26.42  39.87  56.70  36.29 
Livestock  real value livestock per adult in 1989  155.32  550.92  344.72  828.89  418.60 
 real value livestock per adult in 1994  265.13  418.39  462.60  736.04  445.26 
 number of livestock units owned per adult in 89  0.16  0.54  0.33  0.79  0.41 
 number of livestock units owned per adult in 94  0.38  0.56  0.64  0.89  0.59 
land  land per adult in 89  0.34  0.55  0.42  0.66  0.46 
 land per adult in 94  0.39  0.51  0.55  0.63  0.50 
agricultural potential  quality of soil (scaled relative to village mean)
b  1.11 0.93  0.93  0.96  1.00 
 agricultural potential per village (relative to overall mean)
c 1.01  0.94  1.02  1.00  1.00 
 augmented land per adult (land times quality and potential)  0.29  0.37  0.47  0.53  0.41 
export crops  chat grown now?  0.07  0.08  0.16  0.26  0.14 
 coffee grown now?  0.35  0.15  0.02  0.05  0.17 
fertiliser  fertiliser used in 1994  0.57  0.53  0.48  0.60  0.55 
 Using more modern inputs than 5 years ago in 1994?  0.11  0.19  0.27  0.29  0.20 
income source  real crop and land income per adult per month in 89  7.15  16.55  8.72  20.97  12.14 
  real crop and land income per adult per month in 94  11.06  10.79  17.99  22.96  15.44 
  real livestock product income per month per adult in 89  0.32  1.83  1.28  3.61  1.54 
  real livestock product income per month per adult in 94  0.80  2.07  2.63  5.39  2.49 
  real livestock sale income per adult per month in 89  1.90  4.55  5.34  8.32  4.66 
  real livestock sale income per adult per month in 94  6.03  6.20  10.12  16.35  9.40 
  real wage labour income 89 per adult per month  0.42  1.67  1.39  2.94  1.43 
  real wage labour income 94 per adult per month  1.01  0.44  1.36  1.19  1.04 
  real business income 1989 per adult per month  2.15  4.56  2.38  4.21  3.06 
  real business income 1994 per adult per month  5.61  6.83  6.89  8.78  6.84   27 
  real private transfers per adult per month in 89  0.71  0.72  0.92  1.21  0.88 
  real private transfers per adult per month in 94  1.02  0.10  0.39  1.33  0.78 
  real ffw plus aid income per month per adult 89  0.07  0.28  0.06  0.09  0.10 
  real ffw plus aid income per month per adult 94  0.02  0.00  0.50  0.71  0.29 
demographics  male adults in 1989 (above 15 years)  1.34  1.25  1.41  1.32  1.34 
  male adults in 1994 (above 15 years)  1.99  1.78  1.81  1.68  1.84 
  female adults in 1989 (above 15 years)  1.60  1.39  1.62  1.23  1.49 
  female adults in 1989 (above 15 years)  2.23  2.12  1.63  1.59  1.92 
  adult equivalent units in household 1989  5.56  4.65  5.42  4.29  5.08 
  adult equivalent units in household 1994  6.46  5.70  5.35  4.89  5.69 
  household size in 1989  6.90  5.71  6.70  5.32  6.29 
  household size in 1994  7.85  6.88  6.46  5.91  6.89 
  male headed household?  0.83  0.83  0.88  0.81  0.84 
education  head completed primary school?  0.02  0.00  0.07  0.02  0.03 
 average years education male adults (1994)  0.33  0.43  0.55  0.32  0.40 
 average years education female adults (1994)  0.16  0.15  0.20  0.17  0.17 
location  distance to nearest town by road in km  15.40  13.84  12.46  12.46  13.71 
  any road (tarmac, dirtroad) through village?  0.75  0.67  0.62  0.77  0.71 
  all weather road through village?  0.05  0.27  0.36  0.62  0.29 
prices  percentage change in real producer prices for crops  19.86  28.27  37.70  23.26  26.69 
shocks  any serious adult illness episodes between 1989 and 1994?  0.71  0.70  0.51  0.55  0.62 
  the number of adult illness episodes per adult in family  0.34  0.27  0.21  0.32  0.29 
  short run rainfall experience (1994 minus 1989)
d -0.28  -0.20  -0.11  -0.08  -0.18 
  long-run rainfall experience (1994 minus 1989)
e. -0.02  -0.02  0.06  0.02  0.01 
aall values in 1994 prices. 
bbased on subjective measure, asking farmers to nominate plots as being lem=good, lem-teuf=medium, teuf=poor soil. Land weighted average 
score, from 0.33 for teuf to 1 for good. Rescaled relative to village mean, i.e. difference index relative to mean soil quality. 
c average village level potential, based on unit 
value per kg times yield in kg per ha. 
d difference in percentage deviation from mean in 1994 and 1989. Deviation relative to long-term mean for main season in area. 
Measure of how good the last main season preceding the 1994 survey was relative to the last mean season preceding the 1989 survey round. 
edifference in percentage 
deviation from long term mean in 1994 and 1989. Rainfall of last five years relative to long-term mean. Measure of how good the last five years were relative to the 
previous five years.   28 
becoming poor live furthest from towns, even though in terms of the presence of a road 
connection there is little difference. Nevertheless, all weather roads are far more likely to be 
found among the non-poor in 1994, especially those who remained non-poor throughout. 
Finally, producer prices changed least for those remaining poor in both years and increased 
most for those becoming non-poor. The incidence of serious illness in the household was 
highest among those remaining poor, and lowest among those becoming non-poor. Those 
remaining poor and those becoming poor suffered the highest incidence of poor rains in this 
period too, while the best rains in the long-run were for those turning non-poor. 
 
Obviously, many of these mean variables are suggestive in line of the previous analysis. Table 
7 summarises the extent to which the regression model used for the growth decomposition 
helps to explain the changes observed for each group. The top of the table gives the mean 
values, followed by the actual and predicted growth in consumption. As can be seen, the 
highest growth rate is predicted for those becoming non-poor and those remaining non-poor. 
Growth for the latter group is however underestimated considerably. Growth of those becoming 
poor is estimated to be much lower, but still positive, while the data suggest a decline in real 
consumption. In all, growth for those remaining poor and remaining non-poor is on average 
well estimated. It shows the differing fortunes of the poor in 1989. Predicted (and actual) 
growth of those remaining poor is only about half of the average growth rate. Predicted growth 
rates of those becoming non-poor exceed the average growth by 50 percent
24. 
 
The bottom part of table 7 provides evidence on how these different groups fared differently 
during this period of high growth. It gives the decomposition for each group, but to allow direct 
comparison, relative to the overall growth in real consumption. For all groups, increased 
returns to infrastructure, price changes and rainfall are the main variables contributing to the 
total growth for each group. However, there are some interesting differences. In particular, in 
reply to the question did the poor benefit from the reforms, the answer appears to be ‘yes, but 
some did so by more than others’. In particular, the group of poor that managed to escape 
poverty could do so because they had relatively more good land of high potential and soil 
quality, they had more education and benefited from their better geographical location. The 
group of poor in 1989 that stayed poor did so because they had lower levels of these 
endowments. On top of this, they faced worse rainfall since 1989 than this other group of poor 
                                                            
24 Nevertheless, growth for those changing status is relatively poorly estimated, especially for those falling below 
the poverty line (the smallest group in the sample). How problematic is this for our analysis? Our main interest is 
in the effect of reforms, effectively the impact of changes in prices and returns on household welfare. If the poverty 
transitions were poorly estimated because of poor measurement of actual price changes, then this would of course 
be a problem for our analysis. However, the fact that the community fixed effects specification (see table 3) yields 
virtually identical results, this is unlikely to be the case. In particular, the predicted growth rates of a model with 
community fixed effects as in model 3 were virtually exactly the same, again underestimating the poverty 
transitions. Idiosyncratic shocks and measurement error in the left-hand side variable are therefore alternative and 
more likely explanations. As was discussed before, there is little ground to suspect measurement error to be 
systematic, while the issue of idiosyncratic shocks cannot be addressed by lack of further information for 1989. It 
would seem reasonable to conclude hat the current specification underestimates idiosyncratic shocks considerably, 
especially in view of evidence that this is typically high for rural households (on this see Morduch (1999) in 
general and Dercon and Krishnan (2000a) for evidence on Ethiopia). Still, even without idiosyncratic shocks, the 
growth losses from shocks are high. A simple counterfactual predicted growth rate under unchanged rainfall and 
no illness suggests that growth was halved by shocks for those remaining poor and the gap with the average growth 
rate would have been less than a fifth for them.  
   29 
in 1989, and had more illness problems. Those that became poor in 1994 had a relatively poor 
growth performance because despite average price increases, they had a poorer geographical 
location and infrastructure with relatively little good quality land. Relatively poor rains pushed 
them further down. Finally, the non-poor throughout did not outperform average growth at all, 
taking into account their relatively good rainfall experience in this period. Despite clearly 
having the best land, crop producer prices increased below average for them in this period.  
 
Table 7 Explaining consumption changes by poverty transition group (n=354). 
Decomposition using model 6. 









mean values        
ln(augmented  land)  0.06 0.06 0.21 0.33 0.16 
∆ (land in ha + 0.1)  0.29 0.22 0.49 0.28 0.33 
∆ (ln adult equiv.)  0.12 0.18 -0.03 0.12 0.09 
ln (years of education per adult)  0.18  0.22  0.25  0.18  0.20 
ln(adults serious ill+1)  0.23 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.19 
% ∆ (real prod prices)  0.20 0.26 0.38 0.23 0.26 
∆ Ln( rain 5 yrs*seas)  -0.31 -0.23 -0.07 -0.07 -0.18 
ln (distance to town)  0.12  0.05  -0.19  -0.01  0.00 
Road infrastructure   0.75 0.67 0.62 0.77 0.71 
Predicted and actual change in consumption       
Consumption growth  0.18  -0.78  1.36  0.37  0.37 
predicted change in ln consumption  0.23  0.32  0.52  0.44  0.37 
pred. Change in consumption, excl. shocks   0.40 0.45 0.58 0.51 0.48 
% contribution to mean change in consumption       
changes  in  land  0.17 0.13 0.29 0.16 0.19 
changes in labour  0.11  0.17  -0.03  0.12  0.09 
returns to land (technology shift)  0.03  0.03  0.10  0.16  0.08 
returns  to  education  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
crop producer price increase  0.32  0.42  0.60  0.37  0.42 
returns to infrastructure and location  0.45  0.45  0.59  0.56  0.51 
illness  shocks  -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 
rainfall  shock  -0.35 -0.26 -0.07 -0.08 -0.20 
pred.growth rate as percentage of mean growth  0.62  0.87  1.42  1.20  1.00 
 
 
In short, growth appears to have been relatively pro-poor, but not pro-all-poor: the poor with 
good land, good location and high producer price increases, about a quarter of the sample, 
benefited more than any other group. But a third of the sample, the poorly endowed poor, in 
terms of land and location, also experienced the lowest price increases and their benefits from 
the reforms were limited. 
 
7. Decomposing poverty changes 
 
In this section, I will present the results of the decompositions as proposed in section 6, as well 
as some simulations of counterfactuals
25.  For transparency, all the results are for the 
                                                            
25 Poverty measurement is done in terms of consumption per adult equivalent, while the analysis in the previous 
section was done in terms of total household consumption. Annex 3 gives details of the self-evident correction   30 
normalised Watts measure, i.e. the poverty gap using log real income as the welfare measure. 
The actual poverty change of this index was about 29 percent in this period. First, table 23 
presents simple micro-simulations in which I show the impact on poverty from the observed 
total change in each factor, i.e. changes in endowments, in returns or shocks, ceteris paribus. 
As in equations (7) and (14), they are derived by adding this factor to real incomes in 1989 and 
then looking at the poverty impact in percentages.  
 
Table 8 Micro-simulations of the total impact of different factors on poverty (normalised 
Watts index) 
  Impact on poverty of observed total change in 
particular factors (ceteris paribus) in 
percentages, relative to 1989 
increase in land  -9 
increases in adult labour  -1 
change in returns to land (techn shift)  0 
changes in returns to education of adults   0 
crop producer price increase  -19 
returns to road infrastructure  -21 
return to location  0 
rainfall shock  12 
illness shocks  5 
change in household size (adult equiv.)  6 
Memorandum: total poverty change  -29 
 
Better crop prices and higher returns to roads dominate, with even higher percentage effects 
than when explaining growth: the estimated changes in real income linked to crop price and 
returns to infrastructure increases resulted in very large poverty declines. On the other hand, 
rainfall and illness each appear to have even larger effects on poverty than on growth. The land 
transfers also have a substantial effect, while the contribution of increased returns to land, 
probably linked to a shift towards more land-intensive activities, is virtually nil, simply because 
of the limited amounts or the low potential of land available to the poor.  
 
These simulations consider one particular change as the basis for the counterfactual. As was 
argued before, one ‘counterfactual’ is of particular interest: the actual total change and its 
contributing factors. Using (15) and regression model 6 (table 3) as before, table 9 gives these 
results. The poverty index used – the poverty gap but defined in logs – showed a 29 percent 
decline in poverty (which is quite similar to the decline the squared poverty gap reported in 
table 2). The second column gives the absolute decline in the poverty index by each factor, the 
third the contribution to the total change in percentages and the fourth the contribution in 
percentage points.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
needed when using (18).   31 
Table 9  Decomposition of the poverty gap (scaled Watts poverty index) 










a  -0.037 100  -29 
predicted poverty change  -0.038     
increase in land  -0.013  34  -10 
increases in adult labour  -0.005  13  -4 
change in returns to land (techn shift)  -0.001  2  0 
changes in returns to education of adults   0.000  1  0 
crop producer price increase  -0.023  62  -18 
returns to road infrastructure  -0.028  76  -22 
return to location  0.002  -4  1 
rainfall shock  0.016  -44  13 
illness shocks  0.006  -16  5 
change in household size (adult equiv.)  0.008  -22  7 
residual 0.000  0  0 
Actual Poverty Gap 1989  0.128     
Actual Poverty Gap 1994/95  0.089     
aThe actual poverty gap in 1989 was 0.128, declining to 0.089 in 1994. 
 
Note first that this is not an exact decomposition for the reasons discussed in section 5. 
However, the residual is very small (less than 1 percent). The main patterns are maintained as 
before. As before, the largest contributions come from better crop prices and higher returns to 
roads. Part of the reason for these high numbers are the high contribution, in negative terms, of 
shocks: illness and especially rain jointly contributed 60 percent of the total the poverty gap 
change. Furthermore, increases in household size also increased poverty and contributed a fifth. 
Land increases contributed a third – much more than to growth, while the contribution of 
increased returns to land, probably linked to a shift towards more land-intensive activities, is 
virtually nil, simply because of the limited amounts or the low potential of land available to the 
poor.  
 
Nevertheless, the largest part of this poverty decline is driven by one group.. Using equation 
(8), it is found that more than 80 percent of the actual poverty decline is accounted for by those 
leaving poverty between 1989 and 1994. Recall from table 22 that they had relatively good 
endowments, their crop prices increased most and they were lucky with good rains. Those 
remaining in poverty experienced limited growth; their poverty gap only declined by an 
insignificant 4 percent. With poor endowments and poorly accessible locations, increased 
returns via better prices were limited and virtually wiped out by poor rains and illness.  
 
Table 10 gives the final key table of this report. First, it brings together the factors contributing 
to actual growth and poverty changes, as were reported before. Then, the table reports on two 
additional counterfactual simulations: one case in which there was no effect from shocks, as if 
there was full-insurance, say via safety nets. The other one is the case in which there were no 
reforms, so that none of the increases in returns nor in prices actually took place. The growth 
effect is derived simply by excluding these factors from the findings based on the first column 
of results. Since, as was argued before, the poverty decompositions in contributing factors are 
counterfactual dependent (i.e. they are only correct to describe to the contributing factors to a   32 
particular overall change), they cannot be derived directly from the second column.  They are 
obtained by constructing a specific counterfactual distribution and then apply the 
decomposition as in (15) and (16)
26.  
 
Table  10  Decomposition of growth per adult and poverty gap. (Percentage point 
contribution to total growth.) 
  actual counterfactual  counterfactual 
    no risk  no reforms & peace 
  growth poverty growth  poverty growth poverty 
increase in land  7  -10  7  -8  1  -2 
increases in adult labour  3  -4  3  -4  3  -4 
change in returns to land (techn.)  3  0  3  -1     
changes in returns to educated adults   0  0  0  0     
illness  shocks  -4 5     -4 5 
price change  15  -18  15  -16     
rainfall  shock  -8 13      -8 14 
returns to road infrastructure/location  19  -23  19  -21     
Residual  0 0 0  0 0 3 
change in adult equiv.units  -5  7  -5  7  -5  7 
percentage growth  (sum of above)  32  -29  42  -44  -13  23 
 
Total per adult growth (defined by the change in the logs of per adult equivant consumption) 
was 32 percent, while the poverty gap declined by 29 percent. The table gives the contribution 
in percentage points to this change. Since the percentage change in both is very close in 
absolute terms (suggesting a scaled Watts poverty elasticity of –0.90), the percentages can be 
directly compared.  
 
From table 10, it can be concluded that growth in these villages was largely fuelled by the 
reforms and probably helped by peace: better crop prices and better returns to location explain 
most. Poverty reduction is determined by similar factors, but poor rains for some hindered the 
decline. Crop price increases, a factor most directly linked to the reforms, contributed more to 
the decline in poverty than in growth. The poor benefited somewhat more than proportionately 
from better returns to roads, even though the poor include a significant remote group with poor 
infrastructure. Poor households grew in this sample in size by more than average, contributing 
to lower per adult growth and higher poverty: there is a return via additional labour, but even 
adults cost more than their direct return in this period. Land increases for some of the poor 
meant that this disproportionately contributed to poverty reduction, but given the current 
(relatively equal) land distribution within communities and the history of land reform in 
Ethiopia, this is not easily repeatable nor desirable as a strategy. Since the poor typically have 
low potential or little land, they could not benefit from the increased returns to land, relative to 
the average household. Finally, the poor suffered disproportionately from illness shocks and 
were also unlucky with rain, limiting the poverty decline further.  
 
The full-insurance simulation suggests large effects on growth and poverty: growth would have 
been higher by a third, while poverty reduction would have been about 50 percent higher. 
                                                            
26 The decomposition of growth is repeated, but this time in terms of per adult real consumption. This simply 
implies an additional term defined by (minus) the change in the log of the number adult equivalent units in both 
years.   33 
Clearly, the lack of insurance, for example in the form of properly functioning safety nets, 
would add substantially to poverty reduction and growth. The other counterfactual result is to 
speculate, using the econometric model, what the consequences for local growth and poverty 
reduction would have been if policies had not changed. Given that peace would have helped as 
well, but since we cannot easily differentiate, it should be under the assumption of no increased 
security either. Recall however that the impact on prices appears to have been largely from 
liberalising measures. In this simulation, none of the increased returns is assumed to have taken 
place, also implying a correction for the return on the changes in land (and optimistically 
assuming that they could have taken place). The relatively poor local rainfall in a few villages, 
illness shocks and population growth is then predicted to have resulted in a 13 percent decline 
in per adult consumption and a 23 percent increase in poverty. Looking further into this, most 
of this increase in poverty is for poor who were poor in 1989 and remained poor in the actual 
data; those who actually moved out of poverty would have experienced zero poverty growth in 
this counterfactual scenario. This confirms that even if reforms did not benefit all poor 
households in the same way, no reforms would clearly have made the plight of this persistently 





In this paper, the poverty and growth experience of six villages in rural Ethiopia was studied. 
By 1989, these were largely impoverished villages, having suffered and barely started to 
recover from the famine years, while the economy around them was at its knees. Since then, 
liberalisation, devaluation and other reforms substantially affected the relative prices faced by 
households in these villages. On average, real producer prices increased by 26 percent, even 
though differences between villages are substantial. Food consumption grew strongly in all but 
one village – on average by more than 8 percent per year on average. Poverty declined in four 
villages, and increased in the two others. Poverty fell more for the some of the poorest 
households: the headcount  index fell by 16 percent but the squared poverty gap by 31 percent. 
Poverty remains high, nevertheless: the headcount index was in 1994/95 still more than 50 
percent.  
 
Inequality increased, but the panel data show that to some extent this may be misleading. The 
poorest households (the lowest decile) in 1989 had on average the highest growth rates; growth 
rates appear to have been monotonically declining by decile. However, mean consumption per 
adult for the lowest decile in 1994 compared to that for the lowest decile in 1989 had increased 
by less than mean growth (by a fifth less). This was in general the case for the lowest half of the 
distribution. Behind these seemingly puzzling results is rather a lot of movement across the 
consumption distribution, with a substantial number of households moving out of poverty, and 
a smaller group falling below the poverty line.  
 
Can the growth be linked to the reforms? A reduced-form household fixed effects ‘profit’ 
function was estimated, linking real income to fixed endowments of land and labour, as well as 
prices, returns to location and shocks. The model allows for changes in the returns to assets 
between 1989 and 1994. The evidence presented suggests that increased producer crop prices 
are directly linked to the reforms and play a large part in explaining growth. Furthermore, there 
appears to be a growth effect from a shift back into agriculture, especially on good quality land   34 
of high potential, consistent with the policies. Higher returns to roads and good location play a 
large part in explaining growth and are consistent with the increased encouragement of market-
oriented activities, even though in this case this is also likely to be a reflection of a peace-
dividend. 
 
Has this growth been pro-poor? On average, yes. But, more correctly, it has been pro-some-
poor. The poor are heterogenous and at least two group can be distinguished in 1989. A first 
group, about a third of the sample or half the poor in 1989, had since then rather good rains, but 
mainly had quite good land, faced high crop producer price increases and had good access to 
roads and towns. They outperformed the rest of the sample in terms of growth and contributed 
more than 80 percent to the overall estimated reduction in the poverty gap. The other half of the 
poor in 1989 stayed poor in both years and had much lower growth, about a third below 
average. They did not manage to grow as much due to their land endowment, either small or of 
poor potential, while typically these poor live in remote areas or with poor road connections. 
Most of the poverty benefit from the reforms was furthermore wiped out by poor rains and 
illness shocks. This group is not identical to the poorest households in 1989, even though they 
were more likely to come from the lowest deciles
27.   
 
Have the reforms then been pro-poor? Yes, but mainly for some of the poor. The 
decomposition of the (scaled Watts) poverty gap index showed that crop price increases and 
higher returns to infrastructure actually contribute more to the percentage decline in the poverty 
gap than to growth. But for the same reasons as mentioned before, this was mainly benefiting 
only part of the poor: those with better endowments in terms of land and location. Some of the 
households with poorest endowments, such as poor location, also did not obtain much better 
crop output prices from the reforms.    
 
The same factors seem therefore to be driving growth and poverty. But this also constrains any 
poverty reduction via growth. By 1994, the poor contain mainly households with poor 
endowments in terms of poor land, far from towns or with poor road infrastructure. While 
better rains or favourable movements in relative prices will still provide opportunities for some 
of them to move out of poverty, more may be needed. These households are unlikely to be able 
to respond strongly to increased incentives or indeed experience these increased incentives in 
the form of actually higher output prices or returns. This is reflected in the poverty-growth 
elasticity. It is well below one for all the poverty measures discussed: high growth does not 
yield more than a proportionate percentage decline in poverty. The counterfactuals discussed 
also highlight the role played by risk: for example, poor rains in the years preceding the 1994 
survey is an important factor limiting growth for some of the poor. The growth benefits from 
better insurance systems and safety nets, but also to better savings and credit markets could be 
high.  
 
Despite the fact that these reforms do not deliver similar benefits to all the poor, the results 
indicate the high costs linked to not implementing these reforms. If there had been no reforms 
(and peace), returns to assets and real relative prices had remained as they were in 1989. In that 
case, per adult consumption would have declined further and poverty increased by a fifth. Some 
of the poorest would have been worst affected, since they faced the largest negative shocks in 
this period. These households also typically remained poor in 1994/95 in the actual data. Even 
                                                            
27 Two-thirds of the poorest two deciles stayed poor in 1994 while half of the 5
th decile stayed poor.   35 
though they may not have benefited as much as others from the reforms, they would have 
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Annex 1 
The impact of economic reforms on food prices 1989-95 
 
Table A.1   The evolution of real teff prices  
 Price  Local price as a percentage of the Addis Ababa Price 
 per kg













1981-83  1.53           
1984-86  1.92           
1987-89 1.48 119  91  130  73 52 72 61 67 74 
1990-92 1.45 119  93  118  82 75 86 72 77 87 
1993-95 1.31 119  103  120  92 88 93 82 86 95 
Source: calculated from Agricultural Marketing Corporation data files.  
*=wholesale price per kg, in constant 1990 prices, using Consumer Price Index as a deflator (source of the CPI: 
International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund) 
Note that ‘deficit’ are towns in typically net importing regions; ‘surplus’ are towns in typically net exporting 
regions. 
 
To what extent are these measures reflected in the evolution of food prices in this period? 
Table A.1 reports some evidence on this. Prices are deflated by the Consumer Price Index and 
given in 1990 prices. The table shows first that prices by the beginning of the 1990s were at 
low levels compared to the 1980s, although this has to be treated with some caution, since 
harvests had been generally better in the 1990s. The table shows that real prices in the main 
deficit area, Addis Ababa, did not increase after liberalisation. The relative prices between 
Addis Ababa and other towns in Ethiopia present rather suggestive of the consequences of 
liberalisation, in line with predictions. In other large towns in deficit areas, the main trend (if 
any) appears to be a closing of the gap with Addis Ababa, in line with better market arbitrage 
possibilities. The main effect on the level of prices seems to be found in typically surplus areas. 
Relative to Addis Ababa, we find a systematic increase in prices, between 26 to 69 percent in 
real terms. The largest increase happened in Debre Markos, in Gojjam, one of the regions in 
which interregional trade was totally banned and the AMC had been given a monopoly. In 
general, this suggests a positive effect on prices paid to farmers, probably without affecting net 
consumers much in deficit areas. Note that it may well have been the case that net consumers in 
surplus areas may well have suffered from the liberalisation.  
 
In Dercon (1995), the evolution of grain prices in the period before and after liberalisation has 
been analysed further. Using standard time series analysis of price dynamics in food markets, I 
found that before liberalisation, price series behaviour suggested that markets were only slowly 
interconnected, consistent with a serious discouragement of private trade. After liberalisation, 
most of the markets analysed appear to have been experiencing fast arbitrage between them. 
Transaction costs margins did not only decline between markets, arbitrage became faster as 
well, suggesting further increases in efficiency from the liberalisation of food markets.  Crucial 
for our analysis is that this paper disentangled the effects from liberalisation (which happened 
in 1990) and the end of the war (in May 1991). The results showed that the larger impact on 
marketing margins came from the liberalisation and only on some routes did the end of the war 
have a significant impact.    39 
 
A further result of market liberalisation and improved arbitrage between regions appears to 
have been better intertemporal arbitrage. In particular, local seasonal effects are likely to have 
been reduced by stronger interregional interconnectedness. Although the available time series 
are relatively short, a simple indicator illustrates this. For this I used data from 22 urban 
markets for which we have data for wholesale teff prices (as in table 1), at least since 1987. In 
all markets, the ratio of the highest yearly price (in real terms) relative to the lowest price has 
decreased for the period from 1991 onwards, compared to the period before 1990. The decline 
is on average from 41 percent to 24 percent; the range declined from between 32 and 103 
percent, to between 18 and 36 percent. In short, seasonal fluctuations appear to have been 
reduced considerably.  
 
Annex 2: How robust are the econometric results? 
 
As was mentioned before in section 3, the design of the questionnaire results in problems with 
income measurement for comparative purposes. Nevertheless, in table A.2, the regressions of 
model 6 are performed using total real income (with decompositions in table A.3). The first 
column uses the log of real total gross income changes, while column two reports the results 
excluding livestock sales income, since as was discussed before, they may include substantial 
asset transactions that probably should not be counted in income. Illness shocks were dropped 
since they refer to a much longer period, while the number of adults in 1989 was added again, 
since the regressions confirmed the earlier discussion of a possible shift away from labour to 
land-intensive mode of production, even though the coefficient is again not significant. The 
main finding is that the effects are remarkably consistent to those reported using real 
consumption, with roads and crop prices dominating the effects. 
 
Table A.2 Robustness test: using real income with and without livestock sales income 
(N=342) (same specification as in model 6, except for serious illness and ln(adults 
in 89)), robust standard errors corrected for clustering. 
  total income  income without livestock sales 
  coefficient p-value coefficient p-value 
Ln(augmented  land)  0.21 0.16 0.15 0.27 
∆ (land in ha + 0.1)  0.47 0.01 0.36 0.02 
∆ (ln adult equiv.)  0.34 0.07 0.34 0.05 
Ln(adults in 89)  0.03  0.92  -0.13  0.61 
Ln(yrs  adult educ+1)  0.18  0.53  0.36  0.36 
∆ (% real prod prices)  0.83 0.01 0.92 0.01 
∆ Ln( rain 5 yrs*seas)  0.12 0.52 0.48 0.10 
Ln (distance to town)  0.19  0.50  -0.08  0.78 
Road  infrastructure  0.15 0.78 0.44 0.41 
joint sign. F(9,322)  16.77    14.25   
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Table A.3 Decomposition of income regression (table A.2) (as percentage of total 
contribution 
  total income  income without livestock 
increase in land  0.26  0.23 
increases in adult labour  0.05  0.06 
change in returns to land (techn shift)  0.06  0.05 
change in returns to labour (techn shift)  0.07  -0.40 
changes in returns to education of adults  0.06  0.14 
crop producer prices change  0.36  0.47 
change returns to infrastructure/location  0.18  0.61 
relative rainfall shock   -0.04  -0.17 
total   1.00  1.00 
mean change  0.60  0.51 
 
The core findings largely depend on the ability to disentangle the price change effects from the 
effects of shocks, such as rainfall. Note first that most effects, including the effect on prices, 
remains stable after introducing the community level variables. This supports the view that the 
price changes are genuine, i.e. not caused by temporary (village level) price movements, such 
as caused by bad rains. Nevertheless, OLS by attempting to perfectly predict mean real income 
changes, may affect the findings as well. To check the robustness of the specification further, 
two alternative approaches were used. First, it could be argued that poor households may have 
had different ability to respond to real price changes, even given differences in land, labour and 
location (which the regression controls for). To test this, interaction terms were used on the key 
variables to check whether there was any sign of different behaviour for the poor in 1989 
versus the non-poor. Both the effect on rainfall and on real prices were insignificant (at 52 and 
17 percent). Secondly, quantile regressions were used to re-estimate model 6 (at the 33th, 50th 
and 66th percentile). The results were largely unchanged: strongly significant price results and, 
in terms of the decomposition, price and infrastructure/location effects of similar size, and a 
strong negative effect of rainfall
28.  
 
There may be other concerns related to the specification. The choice of land and labour as fixed 
factors was discussed before. Treating them as endogenous, for example via estimating shadow 
prices for them, may be possible, but ultimately among the appropriate instruments for doing 
this would typically assets and demographics, i.e. land owned and labour available, so this is 
unlikely to be much different from the current approach. Secondly, it could be argued that other 
variables should be included. A variety of variables were introduced. For example, age of the 
household head and its square (as a proxy for farming experience) was not significant. Also, 
readers familiar with Ethiopia may wonder why oxen or livestock were not included as a 
determinant in the growth regression. Oxen are of course very important in most farming 
systems, but can hardly be seen as a fixed asset, since they can be freely acquired in the market. 
They would be endogenous to the model, not least because they are also the main alternative to 
not consuming real income and are actively accumulated. Furthermore, livestock and oxen 
ownership is positively correlated with land (whether augmented or not).  Introducing livestock 
(unit value) prices gave insignificant results, but this may be linked to multicollinearity with 
rainfall, which are significantly positively correlated. Lower prices for livestock contribute 7 
percent to growth in this expanded version of model 6.  
                                                            
28 To allow comparison with the other results, the decomposition still used mean characteristics.   41 
 
The large changes in real consumption for some households raises the suspicion that a lot of the 
movement in real consumption is just measurement error. A starting point for investigating this 
is simply to run an autoregressive model, i.e. to regress changes on the lagged value of real 
consumption. The lower (closer to –1) the value on the value in 1989, the more the movement 
presents something just seemingly ‘noise’. In our case, the value was -0.81 and significantly 
different from one, but still quite high. However, once we include the variables used in model 
6, this value drops to –0.21, i.e. a much higher persistence in consumption, once the 
explanatory variables are accounted for. There is little reason to suspect measurement error in 
consumption to be specifically correlated with values included in the regression (e.g. why 
would those with roads or after 1989 having high crop price increases systematically have 
underreported consumption in 1989 or overreported in 1994?). Consequently, it is unlikely to 
be undermining our conclusions. 
 
Annex 3  Poverty when welfare is measured per adult equivalent 
 
Poverty measurement requires a correction for household size, such as in terms of adult 
equivalent units. Consequently, the decomposition in (18) (or any other counterfactual based on 
the regression) will have to take this into account. Define aeuit as the number of adult 
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so that a decomposition of changes of poverty simply requires an additional term that corrects 
for changes in household adult equivalent units. Otherwise, the analysis can be implemented as 
discussed before. 